Medical field is one of the many important fields that keeps growing day by day. Since health care is essential for every human being, development of medical systems play a vital role in the overall development of society. With the help of the Internet, medical services are provided through TMIS (Telecare Medicine Information System). During the process, information related to patient is transmitted over open channels and ensuring safety to this information is an essential task. For this, a number of remote user authentication schemes have been proposed and evolved over the time. Chen et al. proposed an authentication scheme for TMIS in 2018. Through analysis of their scheme, it has been shown that their scheme cannot withstand user impersonation attack, server masquerading attack, password guessing attack and cannot preserve user anonymity. These weaknesses have been presented in this paper. In addition to this, an improved scheme has been proposed which overcomes the aforementioned security defects. Also, this paper discusses the security analysis of the proposed scheme, which proves that it is more secure and can be practically implemented.
INTRODUCTION
Development of the Internet has changed the human lives in an unimaginable manner. Every single moment, it keeps evolving for betterment and hence, progress of every existing field relies significantly on the Internet technology. This scenario also applies to medical field and it has been highly influenced by the Internet. As a result, the concept of e-medicine was introduced and is in demand today. This has transformed traditional patient records to electronic patient records. TMIS is an important part of e-medicine and this provides versatile as well as appropriate health care services for ACM acknowledges that this contribution was authored or co-authored by an employee, contractor or affiliate of a national government. As such, the Government retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free right to publish or reproduce this article, or to allow others to do so, for Government purposes only. CHASE '18, September 26-28, 2018 , Washington, DC, USA © 2018 Association for Computing Machinery. ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-5958-0/18/09. . . $15.00 https://doi.org /10.1145/3278576.3278603 patients. Suppose any registered user requires to access health care services, s/he transmits data to the medical server through public channel and an adversary may have full authority over this channel. As a result, he can easily eavesdrop, intercept, record, alter, eradicate and repeat the message via public channel. As the data is transmitted over the public channel, maintaining privacy, integrity and confidentiality of the data is compulsory. Hence, only authorized users should be able to access data from the medical server. Authentication plays a major role in providing authorization. Authentication is the process of verifying the identity of an entity(can be a user or process). It is a central component of any security infrastructure. Other security measures depend upon verifying the identity of the sender and receiver of information. Authorization grants privileges based upon identity. Audit trails would not provide accountability without authentication. Confidentiality and integrity are broken if we cannot reliably differentiate an authorized entity from an unauthorized entity. Authentication can be one factor or two factor or three factor. One factor authentication only uses an identity and password. It is the easiest means but is least secure. Identity and password combined with smart card constitutes two factor authentication which is user friendly providing enough security. Two factor authentication using biometrics is three factor authentication which provides highest security but implementation cost is high. So, two factor authentication is usually used and different schemes are proposed for the same. These schemes are applicable for TMIS as well. In TMIS, initially a patient has to register to a remote medical server by providing his personal information to the server after which a smart card containing some data is issued to the patient. Using this smart card, the patient can login and after successful authentication from server, he can access services as and when required. Using the authentication schemes, the patient can verify the validity of a server and server too can confirm the identity of a patient. After successful mutual authentication a session key is generated, using which both the users can communicate safely over open channels. While designing an authentication scheme for TMIS, a set of different possible attacks to be avoided are explained in [23] and [32] . So, many authentication schemes were proposed and studied over a period of time. None of the schemes satisfy the required security requirements. Even if they satisfy a few security requirements, they are inefficient in terms of computational cost. Therefore, there is a need to develop robust and efficient authentication scheme. Several authentication schemes for this purpose have been proposed [1, 3, 5-7, 12, 14, 16, 21, 25, 29, 31, 37, 39] . Chen et al. [8] proposed a scheme in 2018. However, in this article, we show that their scheme has weaknesses making it insecure, inefficient, and infeasible for implementation in the real environment. To overcome the security flaws of Chen et al.âĂŹs scheme, we propose an improved remote user authentication scheme, which provides the missing security provisions that are necessary for practical implementation.
The rest of this article is designed as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the related work. Section 3 reviews Chen et al. 's scheme followed by its cryptyanalysis in section 4. The proposed scheme is thoroughly explained in section 5 and section 6 describes the security analysis of the proposed scheme. Section 7 presents the computational comparison. Section 8 concludes the article.
RELATED WORK
In this section, remote user authentication schemes for the integrated EPR information systems have been studied thoroughly. These schemes are employed to ensure secure and authorized communication between user and server [36] . They verify the validity of remote user and server over an insecure channel. Tsai et al. [32] and Madhusudhan and Mittal [23] have clearly explained the possible attacks to consider and the security goals to achieve while designing an ideal authentication scheme using smart cards. Several schemes for the integrated EPR information systems are proposed in literature to improve the existing ones. D. Mishra [26] , Cao et al. [4] and others have proposed different schemes for the integrated EPR system [9, 27, 28] . Recently, different schemes were proposed for various applications [13, 17, 19, 20, 24, 30, 33] . Also, schemes were proposed for health care systems [10, 15, 22, 35, 38] . In 2010, Wu et al. [36] proposed an efficient user authentication scheme for TMIS with low computational cost. But then, He et al. [11] showed that Wu et al. 's scheme suffered from impersonation attack and insider attack. They proposed an improved scheme. In the same year, Wei et al. [34] demonstrated that He et al. 's scheme could not provide two-factor security and proposed an improved scheme. But then, Zhu [40] showed that Wei et al. 's scheme could not resist offline password guessing attack. Then he proposed an authentication scheme based on RSA for TMIS. This scheme was analyzed in [2] and they showed that validity of the user's login request message was incorrect in Zhu's scheme and they proposed new authentication scheme. Kang et al. [18] showed that scheme in [2] has weaknesses like no user anonymity, offline password guessing attack, user impersonation attack and session key derived attack. So, they proposed a new authentication scheme for TMIS. But Chen et al. [8] proved that the scheme in [18] is not secure against password guessing attack, does not verify password and does not preserve user anonymity. So, they proposed an improved scheme and unfortunately we have found several weaknesses in their scheme, which have been addressed in the proposed scheme.
REVIEW OF CHEN ET AL.'S SCHEME [8]
In this section, Chen et al. 's scheme is briefly reviewed. The various phases are given below.
Registration Phase
To access services from the telecare medicine information system server S i , a new user U i must register himself/herself at the server S i . The various notations used in their scheme are given in Table I . The following steps are performed during registration: 
Symbol
Meaning
Symmetric key encryption with key k Concatenation operator D k
Symmetric key decryption with key k ⊕ XOR operation h(:)
Hash function X s
Secret key of the server
sends the registration message {ID i ; RPW i } to the server S i via a secure channel. R2. On receiving the registration request message {ID i ; RPW i } from the user U i , S i generates a random integer N i and
R3. S i then issues a smart card with values {PID i ; B i ; h(:); A i } to the user U i via a secure channel. R4. On receiving the smart card from server, U i stores b in it and the smart card now has values
Login Phase
Whenever a registered user wants to login to the TMIS system server S i , the following steps will be executed:
L1. U i inserts his/her smart card into the card reader of a terminal, inputs his/her identity ID l i and password PW l i . The smart card of U i computes RPW l
holds, it goes to next step. Otherwise, the login session is terminated. L2. U i 's smart card generates a random integer, r u and acquires the current time stamp T 1 . Then it computes
through a public channel to the server S i .
Authentication Phase
On receiving the login request message
A1. S i retrieves the current time stamp T 2 and verifies the fresh- 
and
retrieves the current time stamp T 4 and verifies the freshness of S i 's time stamp T 3 . Then it computes r l 
Password Change Phase

SECURITY WEAKNESSES IN CHEN ET AL.'S SCHEME Obtaining secret value X s of the server S i
An adversary initially registers as a legal user in the system with his own ID, PW , random integer b a and RPW a = h(PW b a ). The system issues a smart card with parameters {PID a ; B a ; h(:); A a } in it. Then he stores b a in the smart card. Now he guesses a value X l s and computes h(ID X l s ) ⊕h(ID) ⊕RPW a . Then he checks if the computed value equals B a or not. If yes, he has guessed the correct X s ; else he repeats the procedure with different values for X s until he guesses the correct value. Once he has guessed the correct value of X s , he obtains (ID N a ) = D X s (PID a ), where N a is the random integer chosen by the server during registration. Since ID is known, adversary obtains N a and learns the format of it and stores it.
No user anonymity
Assume that an adversary comes in possession of the smart card of a user U i with the values {PID i ; b; B i ; h(:); A i }. As explained above, he has knowledge of X s . He decrypts PID i to obtain (ID i N i ) = D X s (PID i ). Since he has stored the format of N i , he separates that many bits from ID i N i and obtains the ID i . So, user anonymity is not preserved.
Vulnerable to password guessing attack
Suppose an adversary gets a smart card of a user with values {PID i ; b; B i ; h(:); A i }, which he stores for his further purposes. From section A, the adversary already has obtained the ID i of U i and also knows X s . He obtains
where B i is obtained from smart card. Now he guesses a value PW l , computes RPW l i = h(PW l i b) (where b is stored in the smart card) and checks if RPW l i = RPW i holds. If it holds, adversary has guessed the correct password. If not, he repeats the procedure with different values for PW i until he guesses the correct value. So the scheme cannot provide protection against password guessing attack.
Vulnerable to user impersonation attack
Assume that an adversary has the values ID i and PW i of a legal user along with the stored smart card values {PID i ; b; B i ; h(:); A i }. He chooses a random number r a and computes
where T a is the time stamp. He then sends {T a ; D i ; PID i ; E i } through a public channel to the server S. On receiving this message, server does the required computations and sends {PID new i ; F i ; H i ; T 3 } to the adversary assuming him to be the legal user. So, the adversary successfully impersonated as the legal user. Hence, the scheme cannot resist user impersonation attack.
Vulnerable to server impersonation attack
As explained in section A, an adversary has user identity ID i from the smart card and obtains the required password PW i of the user U i as explained in section B. Suppose he eavesdrops the login message 
and checks if the condition H l i = H i holds or not and it does hold. Then U i generates the current time stamp T ua , computes M i = h(SK l C i T ua ) and sends the response message {M i ; T ua } to the adversary believing him to be the server. Thus, an adversary has successfully impersonated the server.
THE PROPOSED SCHEME
This section presents the proposed scheme. There are four phases. All these phases are described below in detail.
Registration Phase
This is the first phase where a user has to register himself to a medical server in case he wants to use services from the TMIS server. The different steps for registration are explained below.
R1. U i selects his identity ID i , a password PW i and a random number b. U i computes the masked password RPW i = h(PW i b) and sends the registration message {ID i ; RPW i } to the server S i via a secure channel. R2. On receiving the message {ID i ; RPW i } from U i , S i generates a random integer N i (unique for each U i ) and com-
where X s is the secret key of the S i . R3. S i then issues a smart card to the user U i containing the information {CID i ; B i ; h(:); A i } via a secure channel. R4. On receiving the smart card from server, U i stores b in it and the smart card now has values {CID i ; b; B i ; h(:); A i }.
Login Phase
It then verifies if A l i = A i holds or not. If it holds, it goes to next step. Otherwise, the login session is terminated. L2. U i 's smart card generates a random integer, r u and acquires the current time stamp T 1 . Then it computes
L3. Finally, U i sends the login request message {T 1 ; D i ; CID i ; E i } through a public channel to the server S i .
Authentication Phase
On receiving the login request message {T 1 ; D i ; CID i ; E i } from U i , S i performs the following steps:
A1. S retrieves the current time stamp T 2 and verifies the fresh-
or not. If it holds, U i is authenticated and authentication process continues. If it does not hold, S i rejects the service request message and the authentication phase is terminated. A2. S i generates two random integers, N new i , r s and the time stamp T 3 . It then computes CID new 
Password Change Phase
Suppose a user U i wishes to change his/her password, the following steps are performed: P1. U i inserts his/her smart card into the card reader of a terminal, inputs his/her identity ID l i and password PW l i . The smart card of U i computes RPW l 
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
This section analyzes the proposed scheme.
User anonymity is preserved
It can be clearly observed that the identity ID i of any user is not stored in smart card. In login phase, identity of U i is sent as dynamic identity CID i in the login message, {T 1 ; D i ; CID i ; E i }. This identity CID i changes during every session and is replaced by the new identity CID new i . If an adversary eavesdrops this login message, he cannot obtain ID i without the knowledge of N i . Obtaining N i is impossible since it is unique to every user U i and is changed during every session by the server. Hence, the user anonymity is preserved in the proposed scheme.
Resists password guessing attack
Suppose an adversary comes in possession of a smart card with values
PW i is still safe due to the usage of random number, r u in D i = C i ⊕ r u and in turn E i is computed as 
. So, in either cases, the proposed scheme resists password guessing attack.
Resists user impersonation attack
As explained in section A, user identity cannot be obtained by an adversary. In case, he gets hold of a smart card with values {CID i ; B i ; h(:); b; A i }, he might get CID i but not PW i . To impersonate U i , an adversary has to generate a valid login message {T 1 ; D i ; CID i ; E i }. This is not possible without the knowledge of ID i and PW i . As explained in above section, an adversary cannot obtain password of any user U i even if he eavesdrops the login and authentication messages,
respectively. So, the proposed scheme withstands user impersonation attack.
Resists server impersonation attack
To impersonate a server S i , an adversary needs to have knowledge of N i which is unique for each U i . The value N i corresponding to a user U i is known only to the server S i . It is not possible to obtain N i from the login message 
COMPUTATIONAL COST COMPARISON
This section presents the computational cost comparison of the proposed scheme with [8] . In Table II , T h is the time for executing a hash function, T ⊕ is the time required to execute an XOR operation, T denotes the time required for concatenation and T sym is the time required to execute a symmetric key encryption or decryption operation. 
From Table II , it can be observed that the proposed scheme uses same number of hash functions as in [8] . But the number of XOR operations has increased by three in the proposed scheme. Again, it can be noted that the number of concatenation operations have been reduced to twenty in the proposed scheme whereas it was thirty two in [8] . Another important observation is that the proposed scheme does not use symmetric key encryption and decryption techniques which is more time consuming. Due to this, it can be said that the proposed scheme is robust and efficient in terms of computations.
CONCLUSION
Chen et al. proposed an authentication scheme for TMIS in 2018 using symmetric key encryption. Their scheme has been thoroughly cryptanalyzed and several security weaknesses have been pointed out. This paper clearly explains the identified weaknesses such as user impersonation attack, password guessing attack, server impersonation attack and no user anonymity. To overcome the mentioned weaknesses, a robust scheme has been proposed without using symmetric key encryption and decryption. This reduces the time constraint for implementation. Also, the listed weaknesses have been rectified so that this scheme overcomes all the mentioned security attacks. So, the proposed scheme is efficient and more suitable in terms of security as well as practical implementation.
